![]() Yet while taxation-only may seem less aggressive and easier for local communities and businesses to adapt to than Sinaloa’s rule, it actually isn’t for two reasons:įirst, the CJNG “taxes,” like those of the Zetas earlier, which in many ways CJNG emulates, tend to be higher than those of Sinaloa, my interlocutors in Michoacán, Guerrero, Baja California, and Baja California Sur told me. ![]() Only slowly and sporadically has CJNG begun to move toward a more systematic effort to take over the entire vertical chain, a decade and half behind the Sinaloa Cartel in that strategy. That strategy harkens back to Don Berna’s Oficina de Envigado in Medellín, Colombia though in many of its newly conquered territories, CJNG doesn’t enjoy anywhere the level of thick and intricate connections to local politicians and businesses that Don Berna’s criminal machinery in Medellín did. Replicating its policies in the state of Jalisco, in the new territories that it conquers, the Cartel licenses not just a variety of criminal rackets, such as drug dealing and trafficking and prostitution, but also legal sales, such as of tobacco, alcohol, and even tortillas. In contrast, CJNG has often preferred to act as a tax master and sometimes franchise licenser: taxing all local businesses, without, at least initially, seeking full control across the entire vertical chain of an economy. ![]() CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel differ in how they rule both economies and people.Ī key aspect of the Sinaloa Cartel’s strategic modus operandi is seeking to take over the entire vertical chain of an economy and industry – whether legal or illegal.
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